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Abstract
Standard approaches to counterfactuals in the philosophy of explana-
tion are geared toward causal explanation. We show how to extend
the counterfactual theory of explanation to non-causal cases, involving
extra-mathematical explanation: the explanation of physical facts (in
part) by mathematical facts. Using a structural-equation framework,
we model impossible perturbations to mathematics and the resulting
differences made to physical explananda in two important cases of
extra-mathematical explanation. We then address some objections to
our approach.
1. Introduction
Ideally, a philosophical theory of explanation ought to be fully general,
providing an account of explanation wherever it is found (26). Expla-
nations, however, occur in a wide variety of places (at the very least, in
the sciences, in mathematics, and in the humanities), and it’s not obvi-
ous how to come up with a theory of explanation that can cover such
a wide range. Here, we’ll attempt a small step in the direction of unifi-
cation, aiming at the area between science and mathematics. What we
seek is a theory of explanation that covers cases of extra-mathematical
explanation — explanations of non-mathematical or “empirical” facts
by mathematical ones. Extra-mathematical explanation is an important
phenomenon in its own right, and has risen to prominence recently
due to the role that it plays in arguments for the existence of math-
ematical objects.1 To date, though, there has been no attempt to roll
explanation of this kind into a general theory of scientific explanation.
In this paper we assume that there are genuine cases of extra-
mathematical explanation in science, and seek to develop a theoreti-
cal understanding of them. In particular, we aim to lay the founda-
tions for generalising a counterfactual theory of explanation in order to
cover extra-mathematical cases of scientific explanation. Accordingly,
the aims of this paper are largely orthogonal to the ongoing debate
1. See, for example, (3; 5; 13; 15; 37).
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over the existence of mathematical objects, which leads some to call
into question the legitimacy of extra-mathematical explanations. We
begin with a very general characterisation of counterfactual reason-
ing, before addressing some basic worries with the extension of this
reasoning to include mathematics. Following that, we sketch a proce-
dure for evaluating the counterfactuals implicated in cases of extra-
mathematical explanation, one that yields their correct truth-values.
Finally, we show how to model cases of extra-mathematical explana-
tion using the structural equation framework.
2. Counterfactuals and Counterpossibles
From the outset it is important to note that this is not a paper about
the semantics of counterfactuals. We will not be providing an account
of how to evaluate the counterfactuals operative within cases of extra-
mathematical explanation by situating them within an interventionist
framework, or within a Lewis-Stalnaker semantics. Instead, we abstract
away from the particular semantic theories that have been offered to
date, and focus on three notions that surface, in some way or other, in
all such theories. These are the notions of “holding fixed”, “twiddling”
and “ramifying”. Very roughly, in order to evaluate a counterfactual
conditional, we take three steps. First, we choose some class of facts
to be invariant under counterfactual variation; these facts are “held
fixed”. Second, we allow the facts corresponding to the antecedent of
the counterfactual of interest to vary: we “twiddle” those facts. Third,
we consider the downstream implications for the facts that we are not
holding fixed of letting the antecedent vary: we see how the twiddle
“ramifies” through these facts.
So, for instance, consider the following familiar counterfactual: if
Suzy had not thrown the rock, the bottle would not have broken. First,
we make a choice about what to hold fixed. We might, for instance,
choose to hold fixed the past up to a time just before Suzy throws (as
David Lewis [20] suggests). Second, we allow Suzy’s throw to vary by
supposing that Suzy did not throw. So we choose not to hold Suzy’s
throw fixed, choosing instead to twiddle it. Third, we carry the choice
about what we have held fixed and what we have allowed to vary
through the remaining facts we have not held fixed, looking out, in
particular, for what happens to the breaking of the bottle. So, for in-
stance, if we hold fixed the past but not the future, we can then let
Suzy’s throw vary and see what ramifications this variance has on the
future of the bottle. Of course, this is not the only choice about what
to hold fixed in this case, and we have not offered any specific recom-
mendations on what to hold fixed or why. The point is just that some
choice of what to hold fixed and what to twiddle must be made and
the ramifications of these choices must be considered.
Note that the choice of what to hold fixed is undoubtedly sensi-
tive both to context and to whatever broad reasons one might have for
evaluating a counterfactual in the first place (roughly: to the pragmat-
ics of counterfactuals). Note also that we cannot hold everything fixed.
For instance, suppose we hold fixed all of the facts about the past, the
future, and Suzy’s throw. Then there will be no consistent way to make
sense of varying the facts about Suzy’s throw given that we’re holding
those facts fixed. Or, to take another example, suppose we hold fixed
facts about the past and facts about the future, but allow Suzy’s throw
to vary. Clearly we have held fixed too much, for there will be no ram-
ifications at all of Suzy’s throw through the “free facts”. Or, at least,
there will be no sense in which variations in Suzy’s throw consistently
ramify through facts about the future, which are being treated as free
in this example, given, again, that we’re holding those facts fixed. The
point is that we must always be careful to specify what we’re holding
fixed when attempting to evaluate a counterfactual of any stripe.
These points about what, and what not, to hold fixed have direct
bearing on the present project. For the task of deciding what to hold
fixed is part of a more general project of developing a reasonable proce-
dure for evaluating counterfactuals. Our goal in this section is to sketch
such a procedure for extra-mathematical cases.2 The procedure we out-
2. Baker (2) provides a useful discussion of counterfactuals and mathematics.
However, Baker does not press the relevant counterfactuals into service in
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line provides an account of what to hold fixed in extra-mathematical
cases and shows how to determine the ramifications of any mathemat-
ical twiddling. First, however, we must address two immediate con-
cerns one might have about the very concept of holding mathematical
facts under counterfactual supposition.
2.1 Mathematical Twiddling
You may well be worried about twiddling mathematics. So we pause
here to survey the situation and show that what we’re proposing is
a simple application of familiar ideas about counterfactuals. Just as
in non-mathematical cases, we must hold some things fixed while
allowing other things to vary. If we hold too much fixed, we will run
into needless contradiction; too little, and we will miss the important
connections we’re after. Before we look at how this plays out in the
cases we’re interested in, we’ll look at a few ways in which things
might go wrong. Counterfactual reasoning about mathematics is
perhaps less familiar than other kinds of counterfactual reasoning, so
some examples will help us get a feel for them. But in short, nothing
different is going on here; we are merely applying a standard way
of thinking about counterfactuals to mathematical counterfactuals,
just as we might apply it to biological counterfactuals or theological
counterfactuals or whatever.
2.1.1 Don’t hold too much fixed
Mathematical facts tend to be rather tightly integrated with each other.
Because of this, it is important, when we twiddle one fact, not to hold
too many others fixed. To see what might go wrong if we do, consider
the following kind of reasoning:
What would happen if 5 + 7 were 13? Well, since 5 + 7 is 12,
12 would be 13. Subtracting 12 from both sides, 0 would be 1.
But then all numbers would be identical: for any m, n, m× 0 =
grounding a theory of extra-mathematical explanation, as we do here.
n× 0, and since 0 would be 1 under the supposition in question,
we have it that m = n. And if all numbers were identical, any
number of horrible things would follow.
(A version of this objection can be found in [41, p. 172].) We of course
agree that if all numbers were identical, any number of horrible things
would follow. The problem with the above reasoning is that it im-
ports too much mathematical reality into what is, after all, an unreal
setting. The whole point of counterfactual thinking is to consider cases
in which things are different from how they actually are. Compare the
following reasoning:
What would have happened if John had worn a blue jacket, in-
stead of the green one he actually wore for the photo shoot?
Well, since he wore a green jacket, the blue jacket would be a
green jacket, and this would mean that green is blue.
This reasoning should convince nobody. The problem is clear: too
much of what is actually the case (the actual colour of a particular
jacket) has been imported into the non-actual situation under consider-
ation. What really would have happened if John had worn a blue jacket
is that he wouldn’t have been wearing the green one; rather than rear-
ranging the colour wheel, we should rearrange the locations of jackets.
Of course, we are not barred from holding fixed that John wore the
green jacket; if we are genuinely interested in what would happen if
his green jacket were at the same time a blue jacket, then the above
reasoning is fine. The point is that, in almost all cases, this is not what
we’re concerned with. Absent some very special conversational con-
text, we should not hold so much fixed.
The same goes for the mathematical case. The mathematical reason-
ing above holds too much fixed; just as the full state of John’s sartorial
display wouldn’t still hold if he wore a blue jacket, not all of the math-
ematics appealed to in the given reasoning would still hold if 5 + 7
were 13. Again, it is not as if we are barred from holding the remainder
of the mathematics fixed; it is just that, absent some special context, it
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is almost certainly not what we’re really after, if we’re wondering what
things would be like were 5 + 7 to be 13.
There may seem to be a remaining difference. It is clear just what
would have given way in the jacket example: if John wore the blue
jacket, the green jacket would be elsewhere. But it is not clear just
what would have given way in the mathematical case: would 5 + 7
not have been 12, or would cancellation via subtraction have stopped
working, or would it no longer be the case that m × 0 = n × 0 for
all m, n, or what? To the extent that this is a real difference between
the cases (rather than, say, a difference in the degree of detail with
which the cases are presented), we do not think it undermines our
point. If anything, it reinforces it: evaluating counterfactuals requires
decisions about what to hold fixed. If we hold fixed that 5 + 7 is 12
while entertaining its being 13 as well, then something else must give
way. Even if we turn out to have more decisions to make, or if they are
more difficult, in mathematical cases (and it is not clear to us that this
is so), they are nonetheless no different in kind.
2.1.2 Necessity
We suppose throughout this paper that mathematical truths are neces-
sarily true. Our proposed mathematical twiddles, then, are impossible.
In conversation, we have sometimes encountered this as an objection to
our proposal, so we pause here to sketch our take on the situation. As
far as we can see, there are two possible concerns, only one of which
is worth taking seriously.
If the concern is one about our proposing to do something impos-
sible, then we can set the worry quickly aside; it is based on a misun-
derstanding. 17 is prime, and so 17 is necessarily prime. If we were to
consider what would happen if 17 were composite, our proposal is to
‘twiddle’ this fact. But of course we are not proposing to make 17 com-
posite to see what happens. As nice as it might be to be able to run
such an experiment, we can’t. Nor can anyone else. And of course the
difficulty isn’t mere lack of funding; it simply can’t be done. But this is
no different from non-mathematical cases. It is not practically possible
to change the past, and yet we can explore counterfactuals with false
antecedents about the past. Whatever twiddling is, it does not require
actually changing the relevant facts, nor does it require being able to
change them. This is all as it usually is.
There is another worry in the area, though, that is more serious.
This is that, owing to the necessity of mathematics, we cannot even
entertain what it would be like for mathematics to be any way other
than the way it is. Although this is a serious worry, here we can do no
better than provide a flatfooted response. We deny that only possible
things are entertainable. We can entertain water being H3O; we can
entertain being something other than human; and we can entertain
17’s being composite. We can entertain Goldbach’s conjecture being
true, and we can entertain its being false, although one of these is
impossible. And so on.
To say more here would be to wade into a debate that, while
worthwhile, would take us much too far afield. So, recognizing that
we have stuck our necks out, we will leave the matter there.3
2.1.3 The metalinguistic worry
Finally, we consider what is possibly the most common worry about
twiddling mathematical facts. This is the worry that we are not re-
ally twiddling mathematical facts at all, but only twiddling how we
describe the mathematics, which itself remains as it was. When we
purport to consider a situation in which 17 is composite, this worry
has it, we are really only considering a situation in which ‘17’ refers to
a composite number, rather than referring to 17 (or one in which ‘com-
posite’ picks out a property 17 actually has, rather than the property
3. It may be that some reluctance to believe in our ability to entertain the
impossible is, at least in part, motivated by a lack of theoretical resources
for understanding such an ability. This paper, we hope, helps provide some
such resources. But there are other motivations as well, and those we will
not address here. For more on the relationship between conceivability and
modal notions, see (12; 44).
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of being composite). So while we are trying to twiddle mathematics,
we are instead only twiddling linguistic practice.4
This worry, we think, loses much of what plausibility it has when
we turn to a wider variety of cases. Just as we can consider what would
be the case if 17 were composite, we can consider what would be the
case if the Riemann hypothesis were true, and what would be the case
if it were false. One of these is impossible. The metalinguistic worry ac-
counts for whichever one is impossible by claiming that, in that one, we
are really considering what would be the case if ‘the Riemann hypoth-
esis’ referred to a different claim, rather than the Riemann hypothesis.
But that’s clearly not what we are doing; we are simply considering the
truth or falsity of the Riemann hypothesis itself. The metalinguistic hy-
pothesis cannot accommodate this. Nonetheless, there is a worthwhile
question here: how do we manage to continue to refer to things like
17 and the Riemann hypothesis, even while supposing they are other
than they are?
As it happens, there is a parallel question about the usual counter-
factual cases. Let’s turn to these for a moment, so we can see whether
the usual responses to this worry will apply in mathematical cases as
well. In non-mathematical counterfactual cases, the worry would look
like this: when we “twiddle”, say, whether Malcolm Turnbull became
Prime Minister (PM) of Australia, we are not really considering what
would have happened if Malcolm Turnbull himself had not become
PM. Instead, we are merely considering what would have happened if
we had used ‘Malcolm Turnbull’ to refer to someone who is not the
PM, rather than to Turnbull himself (e.g. to Joe Hockey).
We do not nowadays take this kind of worry particularly seriously.
But it would be a mistake to think that this is because it is obvious
how to respond; it is not. We don’t worry like this about counterfac-
tuals nowadays, because of two broad families of responses we have
4. This worry and the worry discussed in §2.1.1 are in serious tension with
each other, but we have encountered both in conversation and think they
are both worth addressing.
inherited. These responses, we think, are good. But they were not ob-
vious. We pause to rehearse them ever so briefly.
How can it be that we are still talking about Turnbull, even in con-
sidering him as other than PM? On one kind of response, this is be-
cause the person in the counterfactual situation we are considering
bears enough similarities to the actual Turnbull: perhaps, for example,
they physically resemble him and have similar political credentials. On
another kind of response, we simply stipulate that we are talking about
Turnbull; it is part of the specification of the counterfactual situation
we are considering that it is one in which Turnbull himself is not PM. A
situation in which Turnbull still is PM, but in which we use ‘Malcolm
Turnbull’ differently, is simply a different situation than the one that’s
been specified — our stipulation is about political facts, not linguistic
ones.
For our purposes, either of these responses, or any combination of
them, will do. Both adapt completely without difficulty to the mathe-
matical case. First, the similarity approach: even if 17 were composite,
it would still have many of the properties that it in fact has. For exam-
ple, it would still occur between 16 and 18; not all of 17’s properties
are so closely tied to its primeness. As another example, it would still
be the number of the Star in a standard tarot deck; not all of 17’s prop-
erties are mathematical properties.
Second, the stipulation approach: in exploring what would happen
if 17 were composite, there is no possibility that we’re talking about
something other than 17 itself, because it is simply part of the speci-
fication of the case to be considered that we are talking about 17. As
Kripke (19) says (emphasis in original):
“Possible worlds” are stipulated, not discovered by powerful tele-
scopes. There is no reason why we cannot stipulate that, in talk-
ing about what would have happened to Nixon in a certain
counterfactual situation, we are talking about what would have
happened to him [p. 44].
Nor do any new reasons become available because we are talking
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about 17 rather than Nixon, or entertaining an impossible situation
rather than a possible one.5
Whichever way the metalinguistic misinterpretation is to be
avoided in ordinary counterfactual cases, it can be avoided in the same
way in mathematical counterfactuals. Both standard responses carry
over unmodified: first, many of the properties of mathematical objects
will remain unchanged in the counterfactual circumstances we are en-
tertaining; and second, our stipulations are mathematical in nature, not
linguistic.6
2.2 Holding Fixed Within Mathematics
We turn now to providing a procedure for evaluating the counterfactu-
als implicated in extra-mathematical explanations. It is important to be
clear about what we are not trying to do. We’re not trying to argue that
the counterfactuals implicated in cases of extra-mathematical explana-
tion are true. Rather, we’re just going to assume that these counterfac-
tuals are true and then give a way of evaluating these counterfactuals
that yields their correct truth-values. This will then be parlayed into a
general procedure for evaluating the counterfactuals in these cases.
In what follows, it will be useful to have a basic case of extra-
mathematical explanation on hand, along with some candidate coun-
terfactuals for that case. As our example we will use what is perhaps
5. Of course, whether we can entertain an impossible situation remains con-
tentious. But we have already taken a stand on that front (see §2.1.2).
6. A related objection holds that the properties of mathematical objects are es-
sential properties. According to this line of thought, 17 is essentially prime.
If this is right, then a fully Kripkean stipulation strategy won’t help, since
we can’t stipulate our way around essences. This requires more discussion
than we can give it here, but here are two lines of thought in response.
First, our original objection to the metalinguistic strategy stands even in the
face of this objection: it still cannot account for considerations about the
truth or falsehood of the Riemann hypothesis. So this is not a way of res-
cuing the metalinguistic hypothesis, only a way of narrowing the options
for explaining how reference can work in these cases. Second, it is far from
clear that all properties had by mathematical objects, even all mathematical
properties, are essential to those objects (4).
the most familiar case of extra-mathematical explanation: Alan Baker’s
case of the North American cicadas (3).
There are two sub-species of North American periodical cicadas
that have prime-numbered life cycles of 13 and 17 years respectively.
Why those life-cycle lengths and not others? The explanation we ex-
plore appeals to an optimality model that has four components: (i) a
range of ecological constraints that restrict the life-cycle length of the
cicadas to within the range 12–18 years; (ii) the assumed presence of
predators with periodical life cycles; (iii) facts about 13 and 17, in
particular that they’re both prime numbers; and (iv) a mathematical
fact regarding primes and common multiples. The model tells us that
the optimal way for an organism with a periodic life cycle to avoid
predators with periodic life cycles is for that organism to possess a
prime-numbered life cycle. That’s because prime-numbered life cycles
minimise the chance of overlapping with periodical predators possess-
ing numerically nearby life-cycle lengths. For instance, a cicada with
a 14 year life cycle will overlap with predators possessing 1-, 2-, 7-,
and 14-year life cycles. A 13-year cicada, by contrast, will overlap with
predators possessing life-cycle lengths of 1 and 13 only (and, in the 13
case, only when the life cycles are synchronised). That prime numbers
have this property is contained within the mathematical fact in (iv).
The most straightforward way to capture the explanatory role
played by mathematics in this case in counterfactual terms is to
focus on twiddling the properties of the numbers involved: 13 and
17. If, say, 13 had been different — in particular, if it were not
prime — then these cicadas would not have had 13-year life-cycle
lengths. This is because (iii) would no longer be true, and so could
not combine with (i), (ii), and (iv) to deliver the result that having
13-year life cycles is an optimal way to avoid predation. Because of this:
(CF1) If, in addition to 13 and 1, 13 had the factors 2 and 6, North
American periodical cicadas would not have 13-year life cycles.
Similarly:
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(CF2) If, in addition to 17 and 1, 17 had the factors 2 and 6, North
American periodical cicadas would not have 17-year life cycles.
Recovering the truth of (CF1) and (CF2) is only half of the battle. We
must also recover the falsity of counterfactuals like:
(CF3) If, in addition to 4 and 3, 12 had the factors 5 and 7, North
American periodical cicadas would not have 13-year life cycles.
(CF4) If, in addition to 13 and 1, 13 had the factors 19 and 23, North
American periodical cicadas would not have 13-year life cycles.
For if (CF3) and (CF4) are true, then that would seem to cast doubt
on the importance of (CF1) and (CF2) for this case. In order to explain
what to hold fixed, however, so as to render (CF1) and (CF2) true, whilst
rendering (CF3) and (CF4) false, we need to do two things. First, we
need to say a bit about how to make sense of the antecedent of these
conditionals: the mathematical differences at issue. Then we need to
track this into the extra-mathematical case by saying a bit about the
consequent.
Focus on (CF1). The “twiddle” to 13 that we are imagining involves
changing its factors. Suppose we do this by giving 13 the factors 2 and
6. It would seem that a contradiction will quickly arise. For we are
supposing that 2× 6 = 13. But 2× 6 = 12, and 12 6= 13. So it is both
true that 2× 6 = 13 and that 2× 6 6= 13. Similar contradictions quickly
infect the rest of the number-theoretic structure under consideration.
If 2× 6 = 13, then 1× 6 = 13/2. But 1× 6 = 6, and 6 6= 13/2. So it is
both true that 1× 6 = 6 and true that 1× 6 6= 6. Similarly, if 2× 6 = 13,
then any multiple of 13 should have 2 and 6 as factors. So 26 should
have 2 and 6 as factors. But 26 doesn’t have 6 as a factor. So 26 both
does and does not have 6 as a factor. And so on it goes.
That contradictions arise in the situation imagined is not neces-
sarily a devastating problem. There are robust and precise inconsis-
tent mathematical structures, explored and discussed, for example, in
(25; 40; 30; 31; 33; 35). These are based on paraconsistent logics, in
which true contradictions are manageable. However, we do not see the
need, in many cases, to deploy a paraconsistent logic simply because
we are twiddling mathematics; we might twiddle mathematics while
holding classical logic fixed.7 To do this, we must avoid, rather than
manage, the contradictions arrived at in the previous paragraph; the
way to do this is to hold less of the mathematics fixed, so that contra-
dictions do not arise.
We should not go too far, however; we still want to hold fixed as
much as we can with respect to the natural numbers. What we’re ul-
timately interested in, recall, are the ramifications of twiddling 13. We
are not interested in the ramifications of twiddling any other number.
In other words, we want to be able to carry out a “surgical strike” on 13
that enables us to gauge the consequences of altering this number for
physical reality in as much isolation as possible from alterations to any-
thing else within mathematics. Here’s our suggestion: work backwards
from the desired twiddle. First, twiddle 13 and hold some portion of
the number theory structure fixed. Does a contradiction result? If yes,
then relax the amount you’ve held fixed and re-twiddle. Does a con-
tradiction result? If yes, then relax the amount you’ve held fixed and
re-twiddle. Does a contradiction result? If yes... And so on. Stop when
you get to the maximal amount you can hold fixed within mathematics
without inducing a contradiction. If there is more than one maximal
amount, then pick the maximal amount that interests you, and let the
interests be set by your context of evaluation.
Without going through the details, here is the result of applying
this suggestion to the cicada case. One can hold all of number theory
fixed except for the twiddles to 13 if one is prepared to change
the way that multiplication works. For there is another function,
multiplication*, that takes all of the same inputs and yields all of the
same outputs as multiplication except in one special case. Whereas
7. In other settings we might well consider twiddling logical principles (7).
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multiplication never takes in 2 and 6 and yields 13, multiplication*
does exactly that. Moreover, whereas multiplication takes in 2 and 6
and yields 12, multiplication* does not. Below is a graphical represen-


































































































































Multiplication* will preserve the same theorems as multiplication,
and imbue the natural numbers with the same structure, except for
whatever disruption is involved in changing the factors of 13; obvi-
ously we have to be willing to allow that much disruption in order to
make the counterfactual supposition in the first place. Moreover, the
structure will be consistent just if multiplication* does not take one set
of numbers as input and map those same numbers onto two different
outputs. Because functions are so easy to come by, we can be assured
that there is some function that behaves exactly this way, and so no
contradictions will arise by twiddling multiplication so that it matches
multiplication*. This is the surgical strike that we seek: by letting 13
vary whilst demanding parity between multiplication and multiplica-
tion* in all other matters, we can successfully isolate the change to 13’s
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factors and consider the implications this change on its own might
have (if any) beyond mathematics.
You might be concerned that in ironing out one mathematical con-
tradiction, we simply invite more, so the ironing-out process goes on
forever. Or at least it goes on until we arrive at some very non-standard
arithmetic, where multiplication, addition and pretty-much everything
is changed.8 But we do not need to resolve all the looming contradic-
tions. We just need to resolve those relevant to assessing the counter-
factual at hand. After all, that’s all we do in the Suzy and the rock case.
We do not go all the way back to the big bang or even to Suzie’s birth
in order to achieve consistency. We iron out the immediate inconsis-
tencies and leave it there. But somewhere in the background there will
be further inconsistencies looming. Suzy moved her arm in a throwing
motion, yet the rock did not move? She willed her arm to move, but it
didn’t? We simply set these problems aside because they are not rel-
evant to the assessment of the counterfactual of interest. We entertain
her failing to throw the rock, and we don’t much care what went on
immediately before this. There is nothing different in the mathematical
case. We deal with any immediate contradictions and leave it there.9
The contradictions might go on forever, but we do not need to deal
with them all: we simply push the lump in the carpet away from the
area we care about, and that’s the end of it.
2.3 Beyond Mathematics
So that is our basic procedure for handling the antecedent of a coun-
terfactual implicated in a case of extra-mathematical explanation: hold
8. Thanks to Rachael Briggs and a referee of this journal for pressing us on
this issue.
9. In a way, our example of the contradiction generated by multiplication
(once we suppose that 13 is composite) is a little misleading. After all, it
is not clear that any of this is relevant to the counterpossible of interest,
so there’s no need to even consider the contradictions arising there. We
presented the details of how we might iron out such a contradiction by
way of example. But, in fact, there is no reason to think that such further
contradictions are relevant.
as much fixed as you can within mathematics compatible with the
twiddle, without inducing a contradiction. The next step is to connect
this up to the consequent, and to thus track counterfactual changes to
mathematics into the physical realm. Again, we’re after an account of
what to hold fixed. The first thing to notice is that we’re not dealing
with just one structure. We’re dealing with two structures: a mathemat-
ical structure (such as the natural numbers) and a physical structure
(the physical world). Accordingly, in order for changes within math-
ematics to ramify into the physical world, there must be some link
between the mathematical and physical structures, such that a change
to the mathematical structure implies a corresponding change in the
physical structure. This link must be held fixed as part of the counter-
factual supposition in order for the mathematical twiddle to properly
ramify.
The link that we propose to hold fixed is a morphism. The broad
idea is that mathematical systems and physical systems share partic-
ular structural features. In the extreme case, a mathematical structure
may be isomorphic to some physical structure. But, as Bueno and Coly-
van (11) point out, the mapping relation is rarely that tight: often some
looser mapping will be implicated instead, such as a homomorphism
or a monomorphism. The details, for now at least, are not important.
What matters is this: there is always a structural parity between math-
ematical and physical structures to some degree. This matters because
holding fixed the fact that the mathematical structure maps the physi-
cal structure is enough to allow twiddles to the mathematics to ramify
across to the physical system at issue.10 When we hold fixed the fact
10. An alternative to the mapping account would be to treat the relation be-
tween mathematical and physical facts as a logical relation. So, for instance,
it may be that mathematical facts can be used to deduce various empirical
facts. More generally, then, entailment of some order may be used to carry
traffic out of mathematics. Alan Baker (3; 5) toys with a view along these
lines). Again, exactly which consequence relation is needed is a matter for
debate.
A third option, recently suggested by Pincock (29), is to link mathemati-
cal and empirical facts using constitution relations, the idea being that phys-
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that there is a morphism between a mathematical and a physical struc-
ture, what we’re effectively demanding is that changes to those parts of
a mathematical structure mapped onto a physical structure must be re-
flected in the physical structure at issue. The physical structure must,
as it were, keep up with any twisting or bending in the mathemat-
ical structure. Of course, the degree to which the physical structure
keeps step with the mathematical structure depends a great deal on
the strength of the morphic relationship. The stronger the morphism
— the more structure it preserves — the more the physical structure
must bend in response to changes within the mathematical structure.
One final thing: in order to carry the changes from mathematics
through to the physical world, we must make a decision about what
to hold fixed with respect to physical reality. As is standard, we give
the laws priority, and recommend holding fixed as much as possible
ical systems are ‘constituted by’ or otherwise depend ontologically upon
mathematical facts. Such a view lends itself toward a “Heavy Duty Platon-
ism” which Field (16, pp. 186–193) contrasts with “moderate platonism”:
According to moderate platonism [...] relations between physical things
and numbers are conventional relations that are derivative from more basic
relations that hold among physical things alone. The heavy duty platon-
ist rejects this, taking the relation between physical things and num-
bers to be a brute fact, not explainable in other terms. (If one likes to
flaunt one’s heavy duty metaphysics, one can say that there is a mys-
terious relation of platonic participation between physical things and
numbers. But the position is the same whether or not one flaunts it.)
[emphasis in the original]
These three accounts of the relation between mathematical and empirical
facts are by no means exhaustive or, indeed, exclusive: it may be that the
link between the mathematical and the physical is constituted by some com-
bination of the above relations between mathematical and empirical facts,
or another relation entirely. (Further options include identity [mathematical
and empirical facts are identical with one another] or lawful dependence
[mathematical and empirical facts are related by physical laws]. One might
also be tempted to take the link itself to be a relation of counterfactual
dependence. That option, however, threatens to be circular in the current
context.) But there must be some link if we are to make sense of counterfac-
tuals in the context of extra-mathematical explanation at all. For if there is
no such link, then twiddle mathematics all you like — this will never have
implications for anything empirical.
compatible with those laws, whilst allowing changes to the physical
world to ramify appropriately. This, we take it, typically means holding
fixed the laws and the past up to a particular point in time, and then
allowing counterfactual changes to ramify into the future.
2.4 An Evaluation Procedure
We are now in a position to outline our general strategy for evaluating
the counterfactuals implicated in cases of extra-mathematical explana-
tion. First, hold fixed the morphism between the mathematical struc-
ture S that appears in the counterfactual and the physical structure P.
Second, make a change to mathematics while holding fixed as much
as one can without inducing a contradiction. Finally, consider the ram-
ifications of the change by looking at the way(s) in which the physical
structure P twists in response to the twiddling in S in order to preserve
the morphism.
To see the procedure in action, consider again the following four
counterfactuals:
(CF1) If, in addition to 13 and 1, 13 had the factors 2 and 6, North
American periodical cicadas would not have 13-year life cycles.
(CF2) If, in addition to 17 and 1, 17 had the factors 2 and 6, North
American periodical cicadas would not have 17-year life cycles.
(CF3) If, in addition to 4 and 3, 12 had the factors 5 and 7, North
American periodical cicadas would not have 13-year life cycles.
(CF4) If, in addition to 13 and 1, 13 had the factors 19 and 23, North
American periodical cicadas would not have 13-year life cycles.
As noted, we want (CF1) and (CF2) to be true and (CF3) and (CF4) to
be false. To evaluate these counterfactuals, we must first identify the
mathematical and physical structures at issue. The mathematical struc-
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ture is the structure of the natural numbers. The physical structure is
time measured in years. The explanation is underwritten by the repre-
sentation of years via the natural numbers. That, then, is the morphism
we must hold fixed. Now, consider (CF1). To evaluate this counterfac-
tual, we start in the mathematics. We hold fixed as much as we can by
changing multiplication to behave like multiplication*. This leaves 13’s
factors as desired. This gives us a structure, S*, that is just like the nat-
ural numbers, except that 13 is not prime, and factorises via 2 and 6.
Because we are holding fixed the relationship between the mathemat-
ical and physical structures, the physical structure that is now being
mapped onto S* must twist to keep up with the counterfactual change.
The result is that an interval of 13 years is now divisible into six two-
year segments, or into two six-year segments. It follows from this that
a cicada with a 13-year life cycle will overlap with predators that have
two-year and six-year life cycles and thus that 13 is not an optimal way
to avoid predation. So cicadas won’t evolve 13-year life cycles. So (CF1)
is true. Exactly the same story can be told for (CF2), mutatis mutandis.
This brings us to (CF3). Again, we start by holding the morphism
fixed. We then change multiplication’s behaviour so that 12 takes on
the additional factors 5 and 7. This change is then carried down into
the physical structure of years, forcing the division of years to keep
step. The result is that 12-year intervals become divisible into 5 and
7 year segments. Though the morphism forces the world to keep up
with the mathematical twiddle, nothing changes for the cicadas. For it
remains the case that 13 and 17 are the optimal strategies for avoiding
predation. All that has happened is that evolving a 12-year life cycle is
now an even worse strategy for avoiding predation than it was before,
since a 12-year cicada will overlap with even more different kinds of
predators. So (CF3) is false.
Finally, consider (CF4). Hold fixed the morphism. Now make the
counterfactual change to the mathematics. The world keeps up its end
of the bargain, and so a 13-year lifespan is now divisible into 19- and
23-year intervals. The cicadas don’t budge: 13 remains the optimal
strategy for avoiding predation by organisms that have life cycles up to
18 years. Of course, if there are 19- or 23-year predators, then 13 is no
longer optimal. However, there are ecological constraints on the cicada
case that rule out these predators. So (CF4) is false.
We anticipate two responses to our proposed evaluation procedure.
The first response relates to the idea that we should hold fixed the
morphic relationship between the natural numbers and the length of
years. The trouble comes this way: the natural numbers stand in mor-
phic relationships to a large number of physical structures. If all of
these morphisms are held fixed, then changes to mathematical facts,
when they ramify, might well result in massive changes to the uni-
verse. Indeed, the changes could be so great that (CF1) and (CF2) are
falsified. Here’s one example of what we mean: Suppose that we make
a change to the natural numbers. Suppose, however, that this results in
a change to one of the universal constants, which is also represented
by some natural number. For instance, suppose that it results in the
second power having the properties of the third power, turning the in-
verse square law into something that behaves as an inverse cube law.
Suppose further that this change is needed to evaluate a counterfac-
tual like (CF1). The results will be rather bad: if the inverse square law
behaves like an inverse cube law, then galaxies won’t form. The upshot
is that things like cicadas won’t exist, and so no interesting facts about
their life cycles will follow.
Once again, however, this is to hold too much fixed. By holding all
of the morphic relationships between the natural numbers and phys-
ical structures fixed, we end up demanding rather global changes to
physical reality in order to force it to keep step with changes to math-
ematics. So we cannot hold so much fixed. In order to get the right
truth-values for the counterfactuals above, we must hold fixed only the
morphic relationship between the natural numbers and the life-cycle
lengths of cicadas in years. We must allow all other morphic relation-
ships to break upon twiddling the mathematics, so that the changes
implied by the twiddle don’t massively rewrite physical reality.
The second worry follows immediately from this last point: what
justifies holding fixed the morphic relationship between mathemati-
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cal and physical structures at all? Providing such a justification might
seem especially difficult given that we have just granted that one can-
not hold all morphisms fixed; one must hold fixed only the morphisms
directly related to the counterfactual supposition at issue. It is not our
goal, however, to provide such a justification. Recall, our goal is not to
argue that these counterfactuals are in fact true. That is a job for the
proponent of a counterfactual theory of extra-mathematical explana-
tion (and perhaps for our future time-slices). Rather, we are operating
under the assumption that the counterfactuals are true, and then out-
lining what must be held fixed in order to yield that result so as to
delineate a general evaluation procedure. To ask whether it is reason-
able to hold these facts fixed when evaluating counterfactuals is to call
into doubt the truth of the counterfactuals at issue. And so we pass the
buck.
Nonetheless, what we have said here is by no means idle. The pro-
ponent of a counterfactual theory of extra-mathematical explanation is
now in a much better position to know what they must defend to get
their theory off the ground. They must argue that the strategy for eval-
uating counterfactuals sketched here, or something very much like it,
is the correct way to evaluate the counterfactuals implicated in cases of
extra-mathematical explanation, since that would put them in a strong
position to hold that the counterfactuals are true.
3. Structural Equation Modelling
We turn now to the integration of extra-mathematical counterfactu-
als into the broader framework of structural equation modelling. The
model we will use to represent the dependencies in this case is in
Figure 3. To keep things simple, each node in the diagram is a full
proposition; each can be true or false. The model of the dependencies
in question we are using is also extremely simplified, but this is okay;
the point here is not to give a particularly complete or accurate picture
of the details of the cicada case itself, but instead to give an example of
how the kinds of structural equation tools deployed in ordinary coun-
terfactual cases can be used in mathematical counterfactual cases as
well.
The letters in the diagram should be understood as follows (we
use a⊥ b to mean that a and b are coprime: that their greatest common
denominator is 1):
A If a⊥ b, the distance between their common multiples
is a× b.
B If a 6⊥ b, the distance between their common multiples
is < a× b.
C Coprime numbers have larger distances between their
common multiples than nearby non-coprimes.
D When animals reproduce with cycles x and y, they
reproduce simultaneously at common multiples of x
and y.
E Animals with coprime life cycles reproduce simulta-
neously less frequently than those with nearby non-
coprime life cycles.
F Cicadas will evolve life cycles coprime with those of
their predators.
G Cicadas will evolve life cycles that intersect with those
of their predators the least frequently.
H Environmental constraints fix cicada life cycles to be-
tween 12 and 18 years.
philosophers’ imprint - 12 - vol. 17, no. 3 (january, 2017)
baron, colyvan, and ripley How Mathematics Can Make a Difference
I There is a cicada predator with life cycle 2.
J There is a cicada predator with life cycle 3.
K 12 6⊥ 2 and 12 6⊥ 3
L 14 6⊥ 2
M 15 6⊥ 3
N 16 6⊥ 2
O None of 12, 14, 15, 16 are coprime with both 2 and 3.
P 13 is prime.
Q 17 is prime.
R If a number is prime, it is coprime with every other
number.
S 13 and 17 are each coprime with both 2 and 3.
T Cicadas will evolve life cycles of 13 and 17.
Each node in the diagram takes value 1 or 0, according to whether
the proposition it represents is true or false, respectively. We suppose
that all the exogenous nodes take value 1. The structural equations
we use are simple: each endogenous node takes the minimum of the
values of the nodes that feed into it. So, for example, C = min(A, B)
and O = min(K, L, M, N). In some cases, these equations are more
realistic than in others; again, our goal is to sketch the structure of an
approach like this, rather than to defend a particular account of the
cicadas themselves.
Now, let’s consider some twiddles. Suppose, for example, that we
twiddle the handle at I, removing the cicada predator with life cycle
2. Then this change would ramify to T. If the cicadas didn’t have a
predator with life cycle 2, then their own life cycles wouldn’t be 13
and 17. For example, there might be a species with life cycle 14, at
least if there is no predator with life cycle 7 either.
Or suppose we twiddle the handle at S. Since this is an internal
handle, twiddling it breaks the upstream links; the equation S =
min(P, Q, R) that is part of the specification of the model no longer
needs to be respected. But the downstream effects of this twiddle will




















Figure 1: The cicadas
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coprime with both 2 and 3, then the cicadas’ life cycles would not be
13 and 17.
The important point, for our purposes, is how alike those two twid-
dles are. The main difference between these cases, from the point of
view of the model, is that I is exogenous while S is endogenous. The
fact that I is non-mathematical and S mathematical simply does not
affect how they fit into this model, or how we handle them via the
model. The structural equation modelling toolkit is completely insen-
sitive to the difference between mathematical and non-mathematical
cases; as a result, it works just as well on mathematical cases as it does
on non-mathematical cases. We have developed the model with more
nodes than just these; each node, as usual, provides an opportunity for
twiddling. Some nodes are purely mathematical (e.g. Q), some purely
non-mathematical (e.g. J), and some mixed (e.g. F).
This model emphasizes some of the details of the mathematical part
of the cicada case, while seriously simplifying the non-mathematical
bits. We don’t mean to suggest that the non-mathematical aspects of
this case (environmental constraints, predator behaviour, evolution,
etc.) are unimportant. We simply want to make clear that the mathe-
matics involved in this case is not monolithic. There are any number
of different twiddles that can be made even within the mathematics
of this case, and they will ramify differently throughout the system
we’ve sketched.
3.0.1 The Honeybees
Once we see how to model the cicada case so as to make twiddles in
the mathematical and non-mathematical components, it is a straight-
forward matter to model other cases of extra-mathematical explanation
in just the same way. We turn to another familiar case: the honeybees,
as outlined in (22).
Honeybees produce hexagonal honeycomb cells. Why? The opti-
mality explanation for this phenomenon contains (i) ecological con-
straints on honeybees, namely: pressure to be as efficient as possible in
producing and storing nectar; (ii) information concerning the trade-off
between energy consumption and wax production; and (iii) mathemat-
ical results concerning the most efficient way to tesselate a 2D surface
into regions of greatest area with least total perimeter. The model tells
us that the optimal honeycomb shape is hexagonal. That’s because the
use of hexagons is the most efficient way to tesselate a surface area
into cells capable of storing the greatest amount of nectar. Accord-
ingly, hive-bees have evolved to exploit this optimal trade-off between
energy and efficiency with regard to nectar storage and production.
To test the mathematics in this optimality model, we can test
the geometric results of the honeycomb theorem which proves the
optimality of hexagons for tessellating a 2D surface area (17). To do
that, we consider the following counterpossible:
(CF3) If the optimal way to tesselate a surface into regions of
greatest area with least total perimeter had not been via hexagons,
hive-bees would not have built hexagonal honeycomb cells.
CF3 is a coarse-grained version of something more fine-grained, such
as manipulating the perimeter-to-surface-area function, or directly ma-
nipulating the properties of hexagons by altering the interior angles of
hexagonal polygons.
It is straightforward to develop a model of the honeybee case that
is as detailed as the cicada model in Figure 1. Instead of doing that,
however, we will demonstrate a much more compact model. Rather
than dividing up the various mathematical and empirical facts that
may be twiddled and spreading them across nodes, encoding each
using equations, we will simplify matters by treating the mathematical
facts and the empirical facts as two binary nodes that feed into the
explanandum of interest. The model is displayed in Figure 2. To
produce the honeybee case, use the following translation schema:
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A Hexagons are the most efficient method of tessellating
a surface into regions of equal area with least total
perimeter.
B Hive-bees are under evolutionary pressure to produce
the largest honeycomb cells using the least wax.
C Hive-bees will evolve to produce hexagonal honey-
comb.
And use the following structural equations: A = 1; B = 1; C =
min(A, B).
By simplifying the honeybee case in this manner, we effectively
treat any mathematical twiddle on a par with any other mathematical
twiddle with respect to C. So too for the non-mathematical twiddles.
This can be useful if we want to look at the explanations in a very
coarse-grained way, so as to perhaps compare the mathematical and
non-mathematical twiddles with one another. Mathematical twiddling
happens as in the cicada case. Suppose, in the honeybee case, we set
A to 0 by making it the case that circles, and not hexagons, are the
most efficient way to divide a surface into regions of greatest area
with least total perimeter. Then, by the structural equation for C, it no
longer follows that the honeybees will evolve to produce hexagonal
honeycomb.
3.0.2 Generalized Optimality Modelling
One of the advantages of using a counterfactual theory of explanation
to handle standard non-mathematical cases of explanation is that it
can facilitate the process of honing in on those things that are really
making a difference to whatever it is we are trying to explain. The
same is true in cases of extra-mathematical explanation.
Both the honeybee case and the cicada cases are instances of a clas-
sic mathematical problem with a wide variety of applications. This is
the problem of optimising some quantity subject to a specified con-
straint. For example, in conservation biology we might be interested in
minimising the chance of extinction of a particular threatened species,
subject to a fixed budget constraint. In physics we might be inter-
ested in maximising the electric potential, subject to a spatial con-
straint. In economics we might be interested in maximising a share
portfolio return, subject to an investment constraint. By looking at
the mathematical features of optimality modelling as a general phe-
nomenon, it is possible to identify mathematical facts that, were they
to change, would have substantial ramifications through all cases of
extra-mathematical explanation that deploy optimality modelling, of
which there are many (6; 34).
Here we give a very simple example of such a problem in order to
get a feel for some of the relevant mathematics involved. Consider the
problem of maximising the area of a rectangular paddock subject to the
constraint of a fixed and specified length of fencing material. Let the
sides of the optimum paddock be x and y respectively, and let c denote
the length of fencing material available. The problem is thus one of
finding x and y such that xy is a maximum subject to the constraint that
2x + 2y = c. One very powerful general method for solving problems
such as this is the method of Lagrange multipliers.11 We solve the
original optimisation problem by introducing a third variable, λ, and
an auxiliary function of three variables (our original variables x and y
11. See, for example, (1).
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along with the new variable λ). This auxiliary function is known as the
Lagrange function:
Λ(x, y, λ) = xy + λ(2x + 2y− c). (1)
We then find the stationary points of Λ. The first partial derivatives
here are ∂Λ/∂x = y + 2λ, ∂Λ/∂y = x + 2λ, ∂Λ/∂λ = 2x + 2y − c.
Setting these to zero yields: λ = −c/8, x = y = c/4. This gives us an
area for the paddock in question of c2/16.12
A few points are worth noting in relation to this method of solving
optimisation problems under constraint. First, in finding a solution to
our problem, we have also proven that the rectangle in question is a
square (i.e. x = y). Indeed, this is so, irrespective of the amount of
fencing material available. This is a very general result that drops out
of the mathematics in question. Next, note that we have here a general
solution to a whole class of problems. The mathematics doesn’t care
whether we’re interested in areas of paddocks, electrical potentials,
or profit margins. All problems that can be formulated as above are
solved in one fell swoop along with our paddock problem.
Finally, we note that the method itself is very general in a couple
of senses. First, it applies to any function f (x, y) of two variables to
be maximised subject to any constraint function g(x, y) = c of two
variables, so long as f and g have continuous first partial derivatives.
In every case, we form the Lagrangian Λ(x, y, λ) = f (xy)+ λ(g(x, y)−
12. It’s not too hard to see why this method works. The basic idea is that any
maximum of f occurs when the gradient of f lines up with the gradient of
g and thus one gradient is a multiple of the other. The Lagrange multiplier
λ is just the multiplicative constant in question.
Of course, in this particular example we could solve the problem us-
ing more elementary methods. We could, for instance, use the constraint
function to produce an expression for y in terms of x and substitute this
into the function to be maximised. We could then find the value of x at the
maximum and use this in the constraint function to find the corresponding
value for y. But we can’t always do this; the method of Lagrange multipliers
is more general.
c) and find the latter’s stationary points.13 Moreover the method is
general in the sense that it can straightforwardly be adapted to higher
dimensions: to maximising and minimising functions of n variables
subject to a constraint function of n variables. These points about the
generality of the method are important for what follows; not only can
we simultaneously solve optimisation problems from different areas
of science, but we can solve non-isomorphic problems (i.e. ones with
different constraint functions and different functions to be optimised)
by the same means. Moreover, the reason the method works is itself
mathematical.14 The solution above, for example, does not depend on
the causal properties of fences, electrical fields, markets, or the like.
The mathematics underlying the optimality results that drive
the cicada case and the honeybee case are much the same as the
mathematics just described. In each case we are maximising some
quantity, while holding fixed (or, in slightly more complicated cases,
minimising) some other quantity. We might be maximising paddock
area, honey storage capacity, or years between potential overlap with
predators, and trying to achieve this while holding fixed the length of
fencing, the wax available to build hive cells, or ecological resources,
respectively. The mathematics is blind to such matters. We can thus
represent these cases in more detail, if needed: we can add a node
through which the mathematical and physical facts get filtered. This
is easiest to represent in the honeybee case. The case is modelled in
13. In fact the method of Lagrange multipliers provides only a necessary con-
dition for optimisation — not all stationary points of the Lagrange function
are optima. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the solution to the op-
timisation problem exist, in terms of determinants of the relevant bordered
Hessian matrix of second partial derivatives of the Lagrangian, but we can
set this complication aside. This simplified partial solution is enough to
serve our present purposes.
14. C.f. the virtues of the general method of solving homogeneous linear dif-
ferential equations discussed in (14).
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Figure 3: Generalized Optimality
Figure 3. The translation schema is this:
A Hexagons are the most efficient method of tessellating
a surface into regions of equal area with least total
perimeter.
B Hive-bees are under evolutionary pressure to produce
the largest honeycomb cells using the least wax.
C Hexagons are the optimal method for producing hon-
eycomb cells.
D Hive-bees will evolve to produce hexagonal honey-
comb cells.
And the equations are as follows: A=1, B=1, C = min(A, B), D = C.
A pared-down version of the cicada case that includes an optimality
node can be modelled using Figure 3 by switching to the following
alternative translation schema:
A Coprime numbers have the biggest distances between
their common multiples.
B Cicadas will evolve life cycles that intersect with those
of their predators the least frequently.
C Prime life cycles are the optimal strategy for avoiding
predation.
D Cicadas will evolve prime-numbered life cycles.
By adding the C node, we now have the ability to twiddle broad
facts about optimality. One way to do this is to change the way that
optimality calculations work by twiddling the Lagrangian mathemat-
ical basis. So, for instance, we might twiddle the Lagrange function
by twiddling the constraint function. If we do this, then all the rele-
vant optimality models will yield different results. What we will see,
and this is the important point, is that changing the mathematics in
this way is to twiddle the C node in both the honeybee graph and
the cicada graph at the same time and in the same way and with the
same upshot: namely, D = 0. The mathematics of optimisation then
unifies both of these explanations (and many more besides), whilst
also preserving the counterfactual dependence of empirical results on
mathematical facts (namely, facts about Lagrange multipliers). What
we can see, then, is that the mathematical results about primes or about
hexagons are, in some sense, secondary to the mathematics underly-
ing the optimality process used to recover the explanandum in each
case. The more general interest of this is that we are able to find this
“master handle” in much the same way that such handles are found
in ordinary cases of causal modelling, further demonstrating the com-
mon refrain of this paper: whatever you want to say about counterfac-
tuals in ordinary cases, you can say the very same sorts of things in
an extra-mathematical context. There really is no reason for concern
about the generalisation of counterfactual theories of explanation over
to extra-mathematical explanations.
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4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we’ve shown that the familiar tools of structural equation
models and counterfactual dependence are flexible enough to apply to
extra-mathematical explanations in much the same way as they apply
to causal explanations.
There is a lot, of course, that we haven’t done. We haven’t de-
fended these familiar tools as an account of explanation at all. For
that, see (28; 42; 43). We also haven’t given a semantics that can han-
dle the counterfactuals we’ve appealed to — and since these counter-
factuals have impossible antecedents, the accounts of (20; 36) won’t
work. Accounts that will work, however, are not hard to come by; see
(8; 9; 10; 18; 21; 23; 24; 27; 32; 38; 39).
Finally, we haven’t explored the possibilities for making good on
our opening motivation: to find a single account of explanation that
can help us understand all kinds of explanation, from an explanatory
proof of a mathematical theorem all the way to explanations of billiard
ball velocities. But this is as it should be, for now; unified theories get
built up piece by piece, not all at once. We trust that this exploration
of extra-mathematical explanation turns out to have been a step in the
right direction.
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